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The proximate cause of the collapse of the Doha Agenda negotiations in 2008 was disagreement 
over the volume-based Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM). This measure would provide a 
right, but not an obligation, for developing countries to impose a duty when imports increase. 
While many simulations of its impact on domestic prices are available, there appear to be no 
analyses of its potential impacts on the welfare of poor households. Whether such a safeguard 
will increase or reduce poverty can only be determined empirically—if there are enough small, 
poor farmers who are net sellers of the commodity when the duty is imposed, then imposition of 
a safeguard duty may reduce poverty. If, by contrast, most small, poor farmers are net buyers of 
the products subject to the duty, then it is likely that poverty will rise. Empirical analysis for 
twenty-eight countries finds that poverty is generally increased following the imposition of a 
safeguard-type measure. The adverse poverty impact of the safeguard-induced increase in prices 
is typically larger when the safeguard can be triggered, because the adverse output shocks 
typically giving rise to import surges when import prices have not declined reduce the benefit to 
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The logic of the proposed volume-based special safeguard mechanism (SSM) in the Doha 
Agenda negotiations (WTO 2008) seems quite simple. When imports increase from baseline 
levels, a duty can be invoked to protect domestic producers against the threat posed by these 
imports. Such a measure seems appealing from the viewpoint of producers, who might find 
difficulty competing with imports which have, for some reason, suddenly become more 
competitive than domestic suppliers‘ production. As designed, this policy seems potentially very 
important for poverty reduction because most of the poor in developing countries live in rural 
areas, and obtain the majority of their income from farming (World Bank 2008). If all poor 
farmers in developing countries were net sellers of food—as are almost all commercial producers 
in the industrial countries—then a measure that raised the costs of competing imports would 
surely help to reduce poverty amongst this group, as well as to address competitive challenges 
posed by increases in imports.  
However, it is important to remember farm structures in developing countries are very 
different from those in the industrial countries. Many farmers in poor countries remain 
subsistence-oriented, and many are actually net buyers of food. Sometimes this reflects the very 
limited resources available to these producers, other times a desire to diversify their output mix 
in order to reduce their vulnerability to shocks in affecting any one activity. Low-income 
producers are particularly likely to be net buyers in years when the country faces increased 
competition from imports, perhaps because of unfavorable seasonal conditions. Low-income 
non-farm households are likely to be very vulnerable to increases in the prices of staple foods, 
since many spend up to three-quarters of their incomes on staple foods. When many poor farm 
households are also vulnerable to higher food prices, the risk that higher food prices will raise 
overall poverty rates, and hence imperil food security, seems particularly strong.  
Since the proposed measures provide a right, but not an obligation, to impose a duty, a 
key decision for WTO members would be when to impose such a duty. Two approaches might 
seem attractive: (i) to impose such a duty in line with the WTO rules that permit its use, or (ii) to 
impose such a duty when it seems likely that this would help reduce poverty and vulnerability, 
particularly among small farmers. The first decision rule is relatively simple, since it requires 
only information on import levels in the current year relative to imports in a three-year moving-2 
 
average baseline period. The second may be much more complex because it requires much more 
difficult-to-obtain information on whether individual households are net buyers or net sellers of 
the products in question. An important question is therefore how frequently the proposed WTO 
rules would permit the introduction of measures that are consistent with the goals of reducing 
poverty and vulnerability. If they frequently do, then WTO rules could perhaps be used to 
provide simple rules of thumb for triggering the volume-based SSM. If they are not, then 
developing alternative rules of thumb is likely to be important if adverse outcomes are to be 
avoided. 
While many studies (eg Montemayor 2008; Grant and Meilke 2009; Hertel, Martin and 
Leister 2010) examine the implications of the SSM proposals for their implications for aggregate 
variables such as market prices and farm incomes, almost no analysis is available at the 
household level needed to assess the implications of the SSM for its intended objectives of 
improving food security, livelihood security and rural development. This paper uses data at the 
household level to assess the implications of the volume-based SSM for household welfare, and 
particularly for the number of people who fall below the internationally standard poverty line of 
$1.25 per day (Ravallion, Chen and Sangraula 2009), and hence face increased risks to their food 
and livelihood security. 
In the next section of this paper, we consider the methodology used to assess when the 
volume-based safeguard might be applied, and how its effects might be assessed. The third 
section presents the results of simulations using data for individual households in a range of 
developing countries. The fourth section concludes. 
Methodology  
The proposed SSM involves both a price-based and a quantity-based measure. The price-based 
measure is much simpler to use, since it can be invoked whenever the price of a shipment falls 
below a trigger level based on a moving average of import prices from all sources (Hertel, 
Martin and Leister 2011). As noted by Martin and Anderson (2011), such price-based measures 
are likely to be attractive for individual developing countries—and have been widely used in the 
industrial countries in the past. They can certainly stabilize domestic prices in individual, small 
countries relative to the situation without such intervention. However, they point out that this 
widespread use leads to a collective action problem that may require a collective policy 3 
 
response—by increasing the volatility of world prices, these interventions are collectively 
ineffective in stabilizing domestic prices. The best that they can do is to redistribute volatility 
between countries.  
 The analysis begins by considering the sources of increases in imports relevant to the 
quantity-based SSM. Given that the price-based safeguard can be applied quickly when the price 
of a particular shipment is fifteen percent or more below a three-year moving average price, and 
the volume-based safeguard requires the authorities to wait until cumulative exports during the 
year exceed a three-year moving average of imports, it seems likely that the quantity-based 
safeguard will generally be used only when the price of imports has not fallen substantially. If 
this is the case, then it seems most likely that surges in imports that trigger the volume-based 
SSM are due to domestic shocks, such as decline in domestic production due to factors such as 
poor weather. 
The analysis considers impacts of shocks in a range of low and middle-income countries 
that are or may become importers of key commodities, particularly maize, rice and wheat. For 
these countries, we have collected detailed data from household surveys on the sources of 
income and patterns of expenditure—with special emphasis on the consumption of staple foods 
whose price is enormously important for the poor, and on income from production of these 
goods—for a large sample of households. These data will be used to capture the impacts of 
production and price shocks on the real incomes of households.  
The first step in the analysis is to take into account the impacts of unfavorable output 
shocks to agricultural output—such as might arise from a drought—at national and household 
level. These shocks will be represented using negative productivity shocks. The effect of these 
shocks on poor farm households will generally be to reduce their incomes both directly, through 
reductions in the value of agricultural output. Another potentially important effect of this shock 
will be to reduce the saleable surplus of farm households, or to increase the share of net 
expenditure on food, making these households more likely to be adversely affected by increases 
in the price of these foods. In importing countries using a tariff regime, the increase in imports at 
the initial tariff will be a source of national welfare gains, as increased quantities that cost less 
than their value at internal prices are imported.  
The second stage in the analysis is to take into account the effects of introducing the duty 
permitted under the quantity-based SSM. Since the volume-based SSM can be introduced for no 4 
 
longer than a year, it seems likely that producers can do very little to expand output in response 
to the incentives created by the SSM duty.  We therefore use a very simple balance-sheet 
approach to determine the impact of changes in output on import volumes. For simplicity, we 
assume that imported and domestic product are homogeneous, and hence that an increase in a 
duty on imported goods translates one-for-one into an increase in the price of the domestic good. 
We follow Deaton (1989) in assessing the impact of a price change using only the net buyer or 
net seller status of the household in a particular commodity. We considered allowing for welfare 
impacts resulting from food-price-induced changes in wages (see Ivanic and Martin 2008) but 
the evidence (Ravallion 1990) suggests that this effect may take some time to emerge in poor 
countries. The income effect of a yield change was measured very simply using the change in the 
value of producers‘ output volumes valued at domestic prices. 
When the change in imports required to maintain the existing level of domestic use 
following the negative output shock exceeds one of the SSM thresholds, we assume a change in 
the duty along the lines specified in the SSM proposal (WTO 2008).
1 When the country in 
question is a net importer, the impact of the duty imposition is assumed to translate into an equal 
increase in the domestic price. Where farmers were, and remain, net sellers of food, the increase 
in prices will help compensate for any losses resulting from the decline in their output. However, 
for farmers who were—or who have become after the adverse output shock—net buyers, the 
increase in prices resulting from the duty will have an adverse impact on real incomes.  
The estimated impacts on each household will be used to assess the impacts of the duty 
on the poverty headcount. Given our use of the simple balance-sheet approach we also ignore the  
impact of higher prices on consumption volumes. As noted in Ivanic, Martin and Zaman (2011), 
these changes have very small, second-order impacts on the estimated welfare impacts of price 
changes on household welfare. This simple framework provides the most intuitive and clear 
introduction to the nature of the problem. In subsequent analysis, we plan to extend the analysis 
to take into account phenomena like imperfect substitution between domestic and imported 
products.  
                                                 
1 When imports are between 110 and 115 percent of the trigger, a duty of 25 percent is imposed. For imports 
between 115 and 135 percent, a duty of 40 percent is imposed. For imports over 135 percent of the trigger, a duty of 
50 percent is imposed. The Modalities additionally limit each of these duties to no more than 25, 40 and 50 percent 
of the bound tariff rates. 5 
 
Since the focus of the volume-based safeguard is on situations where the price of imports 
does not decline we need to carefully ask why imports might rise when import prices are not 
declining. For most agricultural commodities, this is likely to be the case because of weather-
induced shocks to output which—in the case of crops—manifest themselves through changes in 
yields (Roberts and Schlenker 2010). We considered following Roberts and Schlenker in using 
the deviations of yields from trends, but finally decided to use a three year average of past yields 
as our benchmark against which to compare current yields. To the extent that changes in imports 
reflect changes in the volume of output, use of this average-yield measure as the base should 
better reflect the deviations in imports from their three-year moving average that trigger the 
volume-based SSM than would deviations from a linear trend. We compared the deviations from 
the three-year moving average with those from a linear trend and found those from the three-year 
moving average to be smaller. 
For simplicity and transparency, we begin by analyzing a particularly simple case in 
which yields are one standard deviation below the three-year moving average of the most recent 
past yields. Examination of these yield deviations suggests that these deviations are 
approximately normally distributed, so that an adverse shock of one standard deviation shock or 
greater is likely to occur roughly 17 percent of the time.  In the latter part of the analysis, we run 
a full Monte Carlo analysis of the observed covariation of changes in yields of maize, rice and 
wheat for the twenty-eight countries included in our sample. This simulation allows us to 
understand global poverty impacts of the SSM mechanism with the frequency of triggered 
instances of protection for one or more commodities corresponding to the historically data on 
yield changes. 
Data 
Commodity yield and trade balance data 
We analyze historical volatility of maize, rice and wheat yields and the likely impact of  a 
stylized output reduction on domestic imports using the FAO's FAOSTAT data and the United 
States Department of Agriculture's PSD database. Both datasets contain information on annual 
yields, production, total imports and total exports with slightly different coverage: the PSD 
database contains data and estimates for 187 countries and regions for the period of 1960–2011 6 
 
while the FAO database contains information for a wider range of 211 countries and regions for 
the shorter period 1961–2009.  
In order to maximize the amount of data available for the analysis, we combine the two 
datasets. Yield data were combined in the following way: when a data series for a particular 
commodity and country was only available from one data source, we used that source; when data 
points from both data sources were matching (over 90 percent of values were within a 10-percent 
range of each other), we averaged the two sources and filled any missing observations from the 
available source; when the two data sources differed, we considered three additional criteria 
intended to filter out data of poorer quality in the following order of importance: the number of 
non-changing values as a manifestation of masked missing values (we selected the data source 
which had fewer than 10 percent of non-changing values), the relative size of the greatest annual 
change in the series as a sign of a change in the units used or the collection methods (we selected 
the data source with the largest jump in data 30 percentage points lower than the other data 
source); and the number of observations available (with everything else equal we chose the 
longer data series). 
We combined the data on imports, exports and domestic production in a similar way, 
merging the two datasets when the share of matches between the two data series was greater than 
90 percent and in the case of greater differences between the two data sources choosing those 
series which had fewer than 10 percent of non-changing values. In those cases when both data 
sets had the same share of non-changing values, we selected the series which extended over a 
longer period of time. For the commodity balance sheet data used in the analysis, we used 2009 
for all countries except Belize and Timor Leste, and 2007 for those two countries. 
Household survey data 
We use household surveys representing twenty-eight developing countries (Table 1) collected 
between 2000 and 2009. All of the surveys contain household-level information on production 
and consumption of the three cereals considered in this study (maize, rice and wheat) as well as 
total household expenditures. Using this information, we were able to assess the impact of 
changes in productivity and prices for these commodities on household welfare by calculating 
the changes in each household's cost of living and the change in agricultural profits (sales). By 
counting the number of households whose change in the real income moves them across the 
poverty line, we were then able to calculate the changes in national poverty rates. 7 
 
Results 
Impact of one-standard deviation yield reductions 
Based on the combined FAO and United States Department of Agriculture data on annual crop 
yield variation for the twenty-eight developing countries, we calculated the standard deviation of 
annual yield changes from the preceding three-year average and applied this as a negative 
productivity shock in each country. For all of these shocks, we calculated the resulting decline in 
domestic production and the increase in imports necessary to maintain domestic consumption 
unchanged. Finally, we assessed whether such a level of import increase could trigger any of the 
quantity-based SSM duties and in those cases of net-importers where a particular mechanism 
could be triggered, we applied the appropriate duty as a domestic price shock and calculated the 
resulting poverty impacts. 
In Table 2 we report the changes in productivity, imports and duties for a decline of one 
standard deviation in maize yields from the previous three-year average. In the first set of 
columns, we report the available information on countries' current production, imports and 
exports. In the next two columns, we report the yield reduction considered in the exercise and the 
resulting increases in imports required to replace the reduction in domestic output. Finally, we 
report the price shock represented by the change in tariff among those countries which are net 
importers of maize and we note whether a country has remained an exporter through the 
simulation or whether it has become a net-importer as a result of the productivity shock.  
Table 2 shows the size of the productivity shock equal to the negative of one standard 
deviation from the three-year average. In most countries an adverse shock of this size or greater 
is expected to occur with close to a 17-percent probability, and represents a noticeable decline in 
production of maize with the most severe case being Moldova with a yield reduction of 41 
percent. In 19 out of 28 cases, this reduction in production would translate into large enough 
increases in imports to make the country a net importer and to impose a safeguard duty, often at 
its highest possible level of fifty percent. 
We use the price and productivity shocks reported in Table 2 to calculate the changes in 
poverty in our sample of developing countries reported in Table 3. For simplicity, we assume 
that the productivity shock affects all producing households equi-proportionately, reducing their 
output from its level in the initial database. A key effect of this productivity shock at the 
household level is to reduce the incomes of the producing households in line with the reduction 8 
 
of their output of the product(s) under consideration. In the first column of the table, we report 
the direct poverty impacts of the productivity shock. In the second, we report the impacts of the 
price shock following the imposition of safeguard duty.  In the third column we report the 
combined impact of the productivity and price shocks. In the final column, we report the change 
in poverty which would result from the same increase in the safeguard duty without a previous 
reduction in productivity. 
The results reported in Table 3 suggest that the reduction in productivity of maize 
considered in our simulation would raise poverty by the average of 0.23 percentage points. The 
subsequent increase in domestic price would raise poverty further by additional 0.12 percentage 
points for a total average poverty change of 0.35 percentage points. If the duty had been imposed 
without any previous reduction in output, its poverty impacts would have been milder, equal to 
0.03 percentage points. The observed difference between the poverty impacts of the same price 
shocks can be explained by the fact that a previous reduction in productivity is likely to make 
more households net buyers of maize, making them more vulnerable to price rises. If we exclude 
countries where the SSM is not triggered—whether because the country remains a net exporter 
or because the shock is not large enough to trigger a safeguard duty—the productivity and price 
shocks are larger, with 0.48 percent of the population being forced into poverty.  
At the national level, we observe considerable variation in the size of the productivity 
shocks, the impacts on domestic prices, and the combined impacts on poverty. While poverty 
rises or remains the same in almost all countries, there are a few exceptions where poverty falls 
because higher prices benefit some low-income producers who are net sellers of maize. At the 
other extreme, there are substantial increases in poverty in a number of countries, with the largest 
increase, of over 5 percentage points, estimated for Malawi. 
For rice (Table 4 and Table 5), the direct adverse impacts of the output shocks on poverty 
are larger than for maize in the countries where the SSM is triggered, with an average increase of 
0.30 percentage points. This shocks is exacerbated by the effects of the price increase resulting 
from imposition of the safeguard duty, which raises the impact by a further 0.53 percentage 
points, to a total increase of 0.91 percentage points. At the national level, there is only one case, 
Cambodia, where the imposition of the safeguard duty reduces poverty because there are enough 
small poor producers who are net sellers of rice. In many cases, such as Bangladesh, Belize, 9 
 
Indonesia and Nicaragua, the adverse impact of the rice price rise on poverty is much larger than 
the direct impact of the yield shock. 
Repeating the analysis for wheat (Table 6 and Table 7) shows a similar pattern in which 
the negative impacts of the imposition of duties is exacerbated by a previous reduction in 
productivity. In this case, the average poverty impacts are much larger than for maize, with the 
average impact of the productivity and price shocks in countries imposing the duty being over 
one percentage point. The poverty-increasing impact of the price safeguard intended to combat 
the import ―surge‖ is almost ten times the direct impact of the productivity change. At the 
national level, the effect of the safeguard duty is to increase poverty in all of the countries that 
are eligible to impose it.  
We complete our analysis by analyzing the poverty impacts of a combination of the 
negative shocks of all three commodities. As in the case of individual commodities, we again 
find that the adverse poverty impact of the output declines is exacerbated by the imposition of 
the safeguard duties (Table 8). 
Distribution of SSM triggers 
To estimate the distribution of poverty impacts of the quantity-based SSM mechanism, we 
estimated the variance-covariance matrix of national yield deviations from three-year moving 
averages for each commodity for the twenty-eight countries included in our survey. For each 
commodity and country, we began with a matrix of pseudo-normally distributed variables and 
transformed them into series with the estimated variance-covariance using a Choleski 
decomposition technique. We then use Monte Carlo techniques to simulate a set of productivity 
changes and the safeguard duty permitted by the quantity-based SSM provisions. 
Our analysis of the Monte-Carlo-simulated distribution of productivity changes suggests 
that quantity-based SSM measures are likely to be triggered quite often: considering the 
historical variation in the yields of maize, rice and wheat in our sample of twenty-eight 
developing countries, in about half of the cases we observe that at least one SSM duty has been 
triggered in more than twenty percent of the countries. While simultaneous triggers of all three 
commodities within one country are quite rare (observed in less than one percent of all cases), 
SSM duties for two commodities are triggered at the same time much more often (11 percent of 
the cases). At least one commodity triggers an SSM duty very often (in 41 percent of the cases) 
and no triggers are observed in 47 percent of all cases. 10 
 
With regard to the average size of the SSM tariff response, we observe that the 
probability of the largest response, a fifty-percent duty, is the most frequently-imposed. In other 
words, when imports rise above the minimum trigger level, they most often rise sufficiently to 
trigger the highest duty, as shown in Table 9. The table also shows that SSM tariffs are more 
likely to be triggered in the case of rice and maize than in the case of wheat, reflecting the 
relative yield volatility levels among these crops. 
Monte Carlo Simulation 
In our stochastic Monte Carlo simulation, we considered 400 randomly drawn vectors of yield 
changes (each vector containing yield shocks for all countries and commodities) the distributions 
of which resembled closely the historically observed multivariate distribution of yields, i.e. the 
covariance matrices of both distributions were roughly equal. In each run, we calculated the 
resulting global poverty impacts of the yield changes and also of yield changes accompanied 
with the triggered tariff response (for net importers). We then apply the simulated productivity 
and price changes to the households in our survey sample and calculate national changes in 
poverty rates. Following the approach of Ivanic, Martin and Zaman (2011), we then extrapolate 
national poverty changes into global poverty changes, expressed in actual numbers of people. 
The results of these two simulations are shown in Figure 1 which suggests that the 
imposition of quantity-based SSM is likely to significantly raise the poverty impacts of the 
existing productivity shocks. The red line in the figure shows the recovered poverty distribution 
of the historical yield variations in maize, rice and wheat. This baseline distribution is, as 
expected, centered above zero, reflecting the fact that the average change in productivity is zero 
with no net poverty impacts. Interestingly, the recovered distribution of global poverty changes 
appears to have a relatively large standard deviation of 17.7 million people, reflecting the facts 
that yield variations in larger countries and covariations across commodities and regions are 
significant. 
When we combine the impacts of the productivity shocks with the SSM tariff responses 
(only applied when triggered and only to net importers), we can see that the distribution of 
poverty changes shifts to the right, raising the average net poverty impact of the existing yield 
variation. The mean of the new distribution is 45.4 million people and the standard deviation is 
32.3 million. 11 
 
Conclusions 
In this work we considered the implications of the proposed quantity-based special safeguard 
mechanism (SSM), which would allow developing countries to impose safeguard duties when 
their imports agricultural commodities rise above defined threshold levels. Identifying domestic 
yield variations as the most likely causes of these import surges, we analyze the likely impact of 
these policy responses on poverty in the imposing countries. To make our analysis a faithful 
representation of the real world, we consider historically observed variations in and covariations 
between the yields of several crops (maize, rice and wheat) in a representative sample of twenty-
eight developing countries, and perform a Monte Carlo simulation of the SSM policy which 
mimics the observed patterns of yield volatility. 
Our analysis suggests that yield volatility of the main cereals (maize, rice and wheat) is 
sufficient for SSM tariffs to be triggered quite often—about 53 percent of the time for at least 
one commodity in an average developing country. Our short-run analysis shows that imposition 
of a quantity-based SSM is likely to raise poverty in countries imposing it by placing additional 
burdens on consumers, including farmers who are net buyers because their crop yields have 
declined. It seems clear that a very substantial degree of caution is advised when considering 
imposition of a volume-based safeguard following a surge in imports. 
  Table 1: Household surveys used in the study 








Albania  Living Standards Measurement Survey  2005  3.2  1,671  4,814  0.8 
Armenia  Integrated Survey of Living Standards  2005  3.3  6,815  28,502  10.6 
Bangladesh  Household Income-Expenditure Survey  2000  150  7,440  38,518  40.2 
Belize  Household Income and Expenditure Survey  2009  0.3  1,546  6,794  33.5 
Cambodia  Household Socio-economic Survey  2003  13.4  14,984  74,719  50.5 
Côte d'Ivoire  Enquete Niveau de Vie des Menages  2002  21.6  10,798  57,906  23.3 
Ecuador  Encuesta Condiciones de vida – Quinta Ronda  2006  14.3  13,581  55,666  15.8 
Guatemala  Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida  2006  14.4  13,686  68,739  12.6 
India  Socio-economic survey (schedules 33/59, 1/61 and 10/61)  2002–4  1193.6  301,085  1,499,010  43.8 
Indonesia  Indonesia Family Life Survey  2007  230.0  12,999  69,624  7.5 
Malawi  Second Integrated Household Survey  2004  15.7  11,280  52,707  73.9 
Moldova  Cercetarea Bugetelor de Familie  2009  3.6  5,532  15,066  8.1 
Mongolia  Household Income and Expenditure Survey  2002  2.8  3308  14789  22.4 
Nepal  Nepal Living Standards Survey II  2002  28.6  5,071  28,099  55.1 
Nicaragua  Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sore Medicion de Nivel de Vida  2005  5.8  6,619  36,642  45.1 
Niger  Enquete National sur Le Budget et la Consommation des Menages  2007  15.2  4,000  28,683  65.9 
Nigeria  Nigeria Living Standards Survey  2003  158.3  19,121  92,501  64.4 
Pakistan  Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey  2005  171.7  15,453  79,354  22.6 
Panama  Encuesta de Niveles de Vida  2003  3.4  6362  26,434  9.4 
Peru  Encuesta Nacional de Hogares  2007  29.5  22,201  95,466  7.9 
Rwanda  Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey  2005  10.4  6,900  34,785  76.6 
Sri Lanka  Household Income and Expenditure Survey  2007  20.4  4,633  20,290  14.0 
Tajikistan  Living Standards Measurement Survey  2007  7.1  4,644  29,412  21.5 
Timor-Leste  Poverty Assessment Project  2000  1.2  1,800  9,113  52.9 
Uganda  Socio-Economic Survey  2005  31.8  7,425  42,220  51.5 
Vietnam  Household Living Standard Survey  2004  86.9  9,188  40,438  21.4 
Yemen  Household Budget Survey  2006  22.5  13,136  98,941  17.5 
Zambia  Living Conditions Monitoring Survey  2002  13.3  4,166  23,074  61.9 
Total  —  —  2,272.3  535,444  2,672,306  38.8 Table 2: Change in food balance, maize 













Albania  216  83  -  37  -17  50   
Armenia  19  120  -  7  -35  NA   
Bangladesh  902  232  -  195  -22  50   
Belize  38  5  -  8  -21  50   
Cambodia  523  -  300  116  -22  NA  Remains exporter 
Côte d'Ivoire  700  22  -  103  -15  50   
Ecuador  945  574  5  187  -20  40   
Guatemala  1,200  758  5  138  -11  40   
India  20,500  7  2,500  2,188  -11  NA  Remains exporter 
Indonesia  6,750  795  25  456  -7  50   
Malawi  3,226  39  300  848  -26  50  Becomes importer 
Moldova  1,422  5  26  588  -41  50  Becomes importer 
Mongolia  -  1  -  -  NA  NA   
Nepal  1,700  60  -  112  -7  50   
Nicaragua  435  125  6  56  -13  50   
Niger  7  39  -  2  -24  NA   
Nigeria  8,700  20  100  1,329  -15  50  Becomes importer 
Pakistan  3,000  7  -  260  -9  50   
Panama  86  406  -  9  -11  NA   
Peru  1,670  1,500  10  152  -9  25   
Rwanda  440  -  -  99  -23  50   
Sri Lanka  56  88  -  9  -15  NA   
Tajikistan  130  5  -  39  -30  50   
Uganda  2,000  43  107  286  -14  50  Becomes importer 
Viet Nam  4,303  536  -  411  -10  50   
Yemen  60  500  15  12  -20  NA   
Zambia  2,800  201  25  789  -28  50   
Average (excluding zeros)          -18  48   
Average (all values)          -18  34   Table 3: Poverty impacts of a one-standard-deviation productivity shock for maize and the SSM, percentage points 
  Productivity  +Price  Productivity+price  Price only 
Albania  0.00  0.00   0.00   0.00  
Armenia  0.00  NA  NA  NA 
Bangladesh  0.00  0.00   0.00   0.00  
Belize  0.00  0.15   0.15   0.15  
Cambodia  0.06  NA  NA  NA 
Côte d'Ivoire  0.26  0.41   0.66   0.35  
Ecuador  0.17  -0.24   -0.08   -0.28  
Guatemala  0.85  0.88   1.72   0.56  
India  0.05  NA  NA  NA 
Indonesia  0.02  0.01   0.03   -0.01  
Malawi  3.24  2.05   5.29   0.73  
Moldova  0.11  0.05   0.17   0.05  
Mongolia  0.00  NA  NA  NA 
Nepal  0.14  0.00   0.14   0.01  
Nicaragua  0.20  -0.27   -0.06   -0.43  
Niger  0.02  NA  NA  NA 
Nigeria  0.19  -0.01   0.18   -0.09  
Pakistan  0.00  0.03   0.03   0.03  
Panama  0.04  NA  NA  NA 
Peru  0.09  -0.03   0.06   -0.06  
Rwanda  0.04  0.11   0.14   0.11  
Sri Lanka  0.00  NA  NA  NA 
Tajikistan  0.01  -0.01   0.00   -0.06  
Timor Leste  0.00  0.00   0.00   0.00  
Uganda  0.29  0.29   0.58   0.14  
Viet Nam  0.17  NA  NA  NA 
Yemen  0.01  0.00   0.01   0.00  
Zambia  0.37  NA  NA  NA 
Simple average  0.23  0.12  0.35  0.03 
Simple average when SSM 
triggered 
0.30  0.18  0.48  0.06 
 Table 4: Change in food balance, rice 













Albania  -  56  -  -  -15  NA   
Armenia  -  25  -  -   NA   NA   
Bangladesh  32,300  614  -  1,611  -5  50   
Belize  12  -  -  4  -33  50   
Cambodia  5,020  13  2  654  -13  50   
Côte d'Ivoire  416  900  -  54  -13   NA   
Ecuador  900  -  106  102  -11   NA  Remains exporter 
Guatemala  23  67  -  6  -26  NA    
India  94,500  22  6,490  7,050  -7  50  Becomes importer 
Indonesia  36,900  1,439  -  1,764  -5  50   
Malawi  75  4  -  19  -25  50   
Moldova  -  16  -  -   NA   NA   
Mongolia  -  28  -  -   NA   NA   
Nepal  2,900  244  -  214  -7  50   
Nicaragua  248  85  -  27  -11  40   
Niger  47  178  -  13  -28   NA   
Nigeria  3,600  577  -  482  -13  50   
Pakistan  5,000  -  2,650  382  -8   NA  Remains exporter 
Panama  195  60  -  38  -20  50   
Peru  1,950  75  -  157  -8  50   
Rwanda  44  35  -  6  -15  40   
Sri Lanka  2,400  40  10  233  -10  50   
Tajikistan  35  10  -  7  -21  50   
Uganda  130  55  20  10  -8  40   
Viet Nam  24,983  600  6,000  1,583  -6   NA  Remains exporter 
Yemen  -  335  -  -   NA   NA   
Zambia  12  22  -  4  -30  40   
Average (excluding zeros)          -15  48   
Average (all values)          -13  28   Table 5: Poverty impacts of a one-standard-deviation productivity shock for rice and the SSM, percentage points 
  Productivity  +Price  Productivity+price  Price only 
Albania  0.00  NA  NA  NA 
Armenia  0.00  NA  NA  NA 
Bangladesh  0.31  3.19   3.49   2.96  
Belize  0.09  0.53   0.62   0.62  
Cambodia  3.95  -4.78   -0.83   -6.29  
Côte d’Ivoire  0.32  NA  NA  NA 
Ecuador  0.09  NA  NA  NA 
Guatemala  0.02  NA  NA  NA 
India  0.41  2.85   3.26   2.87  
Indonesia  0.18  0.71   0.88   0.69  
Malawi  0.12  0.22   0.34   0.19  
Moldova  0.00  NA  NA  NA 
Mongolia  0.00  NA  NA  NA 
Nepal  0.57  0.65   1.22   0.59  
Nicaragua  0.08  0.94   1.03   0.97  
Niger  0.00  NA  NA  NA 
Nigeria  0.16  0.94   1.10   0.89  
Pakistan  0.04  NA  NA  NA 
Panama  0.18  0.62   0.81   0.44  
Peru  0.01  0.40   0.41   0.39  
Rwanda  0.04  0.13   0.16   0.15  
Sri Lanka  0.21  1.40   1.61   1.47  
Tajikistan  0.19  0.93   1.12   0.87  
Timor Leste  0.00  0.00   0.00   0.00  
Uganda  0.01  NA  NA  NA 
Viet Nam  1.15  NA  NA  NA 
Yemen  0.00  0.00   0.00   0.00  
Zambia  0.00  0.29   0.29   0.26  
Simple average  0.29  0.36  0.41  0.35 
Simple average when 
SSM triggered 
0.38  0.53  0.91  0.42 Table 6: Change in food balance, wheat 













Albania  250  300  -  30  -12  25   
Armenia  225  519  -  52  -23  25   
Bangladesh  1,000  3,000  -  141  -14  NA   
Belize  -  18  -  -  NA  NA   
Cambodia  -  43  -  -  NA  NA   
Côte d'Ivoire  -  350  150  -  NA  NA   
Ecuador  9  525  4  1  -14  NA   
Guatemala  9  500  30  1  -13  NA   
India  80,800  2,690  200  5,823  -7  50   
Indonesia  -  5,499  250  -  NA  NA   
Malawi  5  98  14  2  -35  NA   
Moldova  739  75  47  324  -44  50   
Mongolia  230  235  -  67  -29  40   
Nepal  1,400  -  -  133  -9  50   
Nicaragua  -  150  20  -  NA  NA   
Niger  7  65  -  3  -39  NA   
Nigeria  100  3,700  -  25  -25  NA   
Pakistan  23,900  200  500  1,754  -7  50  Becomes importer 
Panama  -  125  -  -  NA  NA   
Peru  230  1,700  100  20  -8  NA   
Rwanda  20  52  1  3  -17  NA   
Sri Lanka  -  986  250  -  NA  NA   
Tajikistan  500  900  -  75  -15  NA   
Uganda  19  344  30  2  -12  NA   
Viet Nam  -  1,343  -  -  NA  NA   
Yemen  200  2,268  15  38  -19  NA   
Zambia  172  107  -  48  -28  50   
Average (excluding zeros)          -20  43   
Average (all values)          -14  13   
 Table 7: Poverty impacts of a one-standard-deviation productivity shock for wheat and the SSM, percentage points 
  Productivity  +Price  Productivity+price  Price only 
Albania  0.00  0.10   0.10   0.10  
Armenia  0.06  0.29   0.36   0.32  
Bangladesh  0.00  NA  NA  NA 
Belize  0.00  NA  NA  NA 
Cambodia  0.00  NA  NA  NA 
Côte d'Ivoire  0.00  NA  NA  NA 
Ecuador  0.03  NA  NA  NA 
Guatemala  0.01  NA  NA  NA 
India  0.25  0.82   1.07   0.83  
Indonesia  0.00  NA  NA  NA 
Malawi  0.03  NA  NA  NA 
Moldova  0.34  1.76   2.10   1.50  
Mongolia  0.02  2.09   2.11   2.09  
Nepal  0.14  0.07   0.21   0.07  
Nicaragua  0.00  NA  NA  NA 
Niger  0.00  NA  NA  NA 
Nigeria  0.00  NA  NA  NA 
Pakistan  0.09  3.82   3.91   3.77  
Panama  0.00  NA  NA  NA 
Peru  0.01  NA  NA  NA 
Rwanda  0.02  NA  NA  NA 
Sri Lanka  0.00  NA  NA  NA 
Tajikistan  0.37  NA  NA  NA 
Timor Leste  0.00  NA  NA  NA 
Uganda  0.00  NA  NA  NA 
Viet Nam  0.00  NA  NA  NA 
Yemen  0.05  0.00   0.05   0.00  
Zambia  0.00  1.00   1.00   1.00  
Simple average  0.05  0.36  0.41  0.35 
Simple average when 
SSM triggered 
0.11  1.11  1.21  1.08 Table 8: Poverty impacts of the application of SSM measures in one-standard-deviation productivity shock, maize, rice and 
wheat together 
  Productivity  +Price  Productivity+price  Price only 
Albania  0.00  0.10  0.10  0.10 
Armenia  0.06  0.29  0.36  0.32 
Bangladesh  0.33  3.17  3.50  2.96 
Belize  0.09  0.53  0.62  0.62 
Cambodia  4.03  -4.79  -0.76  -6.29 
Côte d'Ivoire  0.60  0.35  0.95  0.35 
Ecuador  0.31  -0.27  0.04  -0.28 
Guatemala  0.88  0.89  1.77  0.56 
India  0.71  3.70  4.40  3.76 
Indonesia  0.20  0.71  0.91  0.72 
Malawi  3.33  2.34  5.67  0.94 
Moldova  0.39  1.98  2.38  1.56 
Mongolia  0.02  2.09  2.11  2.09 
Nepal  0.78  0.72  1.51  0.54 
Nicaragua  0.32  0.75  1.07  0.69 
Niger  0.02  0.00  0.02  0.00 
Nigeria  0.30  1.06  1.36  0.86 
Pakistan  0.11  3.89  4.00  3.81 
Panama  0.21  0.66  0.87  0.44 
Peru  0.13  0.32  0.45  0.31 
Rwanda  0.07  0.22  0.30  0.25 
Sri Lanka  0.21  1.40  1.61  1.47 
Tajikistan  0.56  0.98  1.54  0.85 
Timor Leste  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Uganda  0.30  0.42  0.72  0.16 
Viet Nam  1.36  -0.57  0.79  -0.80 
Yemen  0.06  0.00  0.06  0.00 
Zambia  0.37  1.95  2.32  1.73 
Simple average  0.56  0.82  1.38  0.63 Table 9: Relative frequency of triggered SSM responses 








All  72.5%  2.2%  4.6%  20.7% 
Maize  68.9%  2.4%  5.5%  23.2% 
Rice  68.1%  2.1%  4.7%  25.2% 
Wheat  83.5%  2.2%  3.2%  11.2% Figure 1: Density (kernel-smoothed) of poverty changes, Monte Carlo simulation of 400 runs  
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